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ABSTRACT
The nature and depth of internet surveillance has been revealed to
be very different from what had previously been publically
acknowledged or politically debated. There are critical ways in
which the current debate is miscast, misleading and confused.
Privacy is portrayed as an individual right, in opposition to a
collective need for security. Data gathering and surveillance are
portrayed as having an impact only on this individual right to
privacy, rather than on a broad spectrum of rights, including
freedom of expression, of assembly and association, the
prohibition of discrimination and more. The gathering and
surveillance of ‘content’ is intrinsically more intrusive than that of
‘communications’ data or ‘metadata’. The impact of data
gathering and surveillance is often portrayed as happening only
at when data are examined by humans rather than when
gathered, or when examined algorithmically. Commercial and
governmental data gathering and surveillance are treated as
separate and different, rather than intrinsically and inextricably
linked. This miscasting has critical implications. When the debate
is recast taking into account these misunderstandings, the bar for
the justification of surveillance is raised and a new balance needs
to be found, in political debate, in law, and in decision-making on
the ground.
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The significance of communications surveillance was highlighted dramatically by the rev-
elations of Edward Snowden – revelations that have triggered significant political and
popular debate. The level of that debate, how it matches with the reality of surveillance
in practice and the implications of that surveillance, can be characterised by misunder-
standing and oversimplification. If appropriate decisions are to be made about the practice
of surveillance, and the laws that govern surveillance, then the debate needs to be recast
to give a better understanding of the nature and impact of surveillance.
There are critical questions upon which there is a mismatch between the views of those
advocating and supporting the new forms of surveillance and those critical of it.
(1) What constitutes ‘surveillance’ and when does it occur? When data are gathered –
when data are algorithmically analysed, or when it is viewed or analysed by humans?
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(2) Is there a ‘balance’ to be found between competing rights of privacy and security – or
is the setting up of such a balance misleading? Does surveillance have an impact
beyond what is traditionally seen as ‘privacy’ – and can surveillance itself have a nega-
tive effect on security?
There are further crucial issues upon which there are disagreements; perhaps most
importantly the question of whether surveillance by the state can be considered separ-
ately from surveillance by commercial organisations, or whether the two need to be con-
sidered together.
The answers to these questions are not as clear as they might immediately appear –
they need careful unpicking. To help to achieve more clarity, this article looks at internet
surveillance from a human rights perspective, using the framework of the European Con-
vention of Human Rights (‘ECHR’) – a framework appropriate for analysis of UK surveillance
as the convention rights are incorporated into UK law through the Human Rights Act 1998,
and one of the most comprehensive and accepted formulations of human rights world-
wide. It examines the impact that surveillance has upon the ways that people use com-
munications and the internet, and hence upon how people live, and suggests that this
impact has the potential to be far more significant than is commonly presented.
Further, it suggests that the idea of a ‘balance’ between ‘privacy’ and ‘security’ is a mislead-
ing idea in itself: firstly because surveillance impacts upon far more than traditional
privacy, and secondly because neither the concept of privacy, nor that of security, is as
simple as it is often portrayed. Measures to protect privacy may improve security – and
measures that purport to improve security may in other ways actually reduce that security.
This article is not intended as an exhaustive or detailed legal analysis. Indeed, legal
analysis can only ever be part of the debate, particularly as it is questionable whether
the law is ever really able to keep pace with either the technology or the way that
people use it.1 Rather, the article is intended to raise questions and open up debate.
The examples used are not restricted to one state or jurisdiction; much of the best analysis
and research, for example, comes from the US while the use by UK authorities of a ‘neither
confirm nor deny’ policy, along with the natural secrecy associated with intelligence work,
makes garnering information from the UK harder than it might be. The internet, moreover,
is by its nature international – surveillance needs to be considered in that context, and the
debate over it needs to be one that is not confined to individual states and their particular
circumstances and particular laws. It is not just law but principles that are at stake, and the
policies and practices of global corporations as well as government authorities.
1. A miscast debate
Communications surveillance had become a significant topic of political conversation, par-
ticularly in the UK, even before Edward Snowden made his leaks. The Communications
Data Bill in 2012, dubbed by campaigners the ‘snooper’s charter’, failed to make its way
through Parliament after much debate and a highly critical analysis by the Joint Parliamen-
tary Committee appointed to scrutinise it.
Since Snowden’s revelations six months later, though there has been considerable
debate on the subject, it has to a great extent been limited and miscast. When Sir
Malcolm Rifkind, Chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC), announced the
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first ‘public’ hearing of that committee, he said, ‘There is a balance to be found between
our individual right to privacy and our collective right to security.’2
This comment was repeated directly in the ISC’s call for evidence in its inquiry into the
intelligence services’ interception of communications in December 2013 (ISC 2013) and
remains a common argument. Andy Burnham MP, the Shadow Home Secretary, used it
as the basis of his speech in the second reading of the Investigatory Powers Bill in
March 2016.3 It is not restricted to the UK. The 2016 Intelligence and Security Review in
New Zealand, for example, repeated it in very similar terms: ‘The debate about how
best to balance the need for security and the privacy of individuals will continue for as
long as both are seen as essential to a free society’ (Cullen and Reddy 2016).
It is not just a theoretical discussion; in relation to the Investigatory Powers Bill, the bulk
powers Codes of Practice explicitly discuss interference only with ‘an individual’s rights
under Article 8’ of the ECHR, not other rights, individual or collective.4 These ideas
reflect a relatively common misunderstanding of the issues at the heart of the debate
over surveillance. Surveillance impacts not just upon individual privacy, but upon a
wide range of human rights, from freedom of expression and freedom of association
and assembly, to protection from discrimination – some because privacy acts as a
gateway or guardian to those rights, and some independently of what is generally
thought of as privacy. The impact is not just on individuals but on communities and
other groups – and casting the debate as one of individual vs. collective rights is mislead-
ing, as it inappropriately downplays the significance of surveillance. The nature of the
impact of surveillance needs to be understood better if a more appropriate balance is
to be found between people’s rights and liberties and the duties of states both to
provide security and to protect freedoms for their citizens.
That such a rebalancing exercise is necessary has been emphasised by the ruling of the
Court of Justice of the European Union (‘CJEU’) in the Digital Rights Ireland case in April
2014, that the Data Retention Directive (Directive 2006/24/EC) was invalid. The Data Reten-
tion Directive effectively required communications providers to retain specified communi-
cations data (as defined within the directive) for a period of between 6 and 24 months, as
determined by the member state, and to make that data available to ‘competent national
authorities’. As the CJEU put it, referring to the rights set out in Articles 7 and 8 of the
Charter (rights to respect for private and family life and to protection of personal data):
… Directive 2006/24 entails a wide-ranging and particularly serious interference with those
fundamental rights in the legal order of the EU, without such an interference being precisely
circumscribed by provisions to ensure that it is actually limited to what is strictly necessary.5
Article 7 of the Charter is the equivalent of Article 8 of the ECHR, whilst Article 8 of the
Charter conﬁrms that protection of personal data is itself a fundamental right – a point
which is critical to understanding the signiﬁcance of the gathering and retention of
such personal data.
Effectively, the CJEU ruled that the interference with these fundamental rights was dis-
proportionate, noting for example that it ‘applies even to persons for whom there is no
evidence capable of suggesting that their conduct might have a link, even an indirect
or remote one, with serious crime’6 and that it ‘fails to lay down any objective criterion
by which to determine the limits of the access of the competent national authorities to
the data’.7 In essence, the CJEU could be viewed as asking for the balancing exercise to
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be made explicit and appropriate. The full impact of the Digital Rights Ireland case is still
not clear – particularly with a legal challenge to the UK’s replacement of their implemen-
tation of the Data Retention Directive currently being reviewed by the CJEU.8 The success
or failure of that challenge, however, will not alter the CJEU’s analysis that the retention of
data itself engages these fundamental rights.
2. ‘New’ forms of surveillance
The various leaks by Edward Snowden revealed some of what can be described as ‘new’
forms of surveillance, as have recent legislative measures in the UK, from 2012’s failed
Draft Communications Data Bill to the Investigatory Powers Bill proceeding through par-
liament in 2016.9 Much of this had been previously a matter primarily of speculation – that
speculation driven in the UK, to an extent, by the ‘neither confirm nor deny’ policy of the
intelligence and security agencies. Now, however, more is being revealed and there do
appear to be some identifiable characteristics that differentiate these forms of surveillance
from the more ‘traditional’ techniques such as analogue phone-tapping, photography, lis-
tening devices and so forth:
(1) The focus of surveillance activities is on ‘metadata’ or ‘communications data’ as much
as on ‘content’ – though these terms are far from clear or separate. This focus appears
not to be out of a desire to protect privacy, though the need to comply with what
might loosely be described as ‘traditional’ laws protecting the privacy of communi-
cations appears to play a role, but because the metadata/communications data can
be just as revealing, though in different ways, and is more easily analysed and
processed.
(2) They operate on a ‘gather in bulk, access in detail’ basis. The question of whether this
constitutes ‘mass surveillance’ is one of the key parts of the debate, but may as dis-
cussed below, be a largely semantic argument. What is clear is that surveillance law
and practice as it currently exists, and is being legally proposed, involves gathering
of massive amounts of data. In the Investigatory Powers Bill, for example, there are
a whole series of ‘bulk powers’10 – bulk interception, bulk acquisition of communi-
cations data, bulk equipment interference, ‘bulk personal datasets’ (‘BPDs’) – where
there are no limits on how ‘bulky’ the bulk might be.11 The Investigatory Powers Bill
also allows for ‘thematic warrants’. As the Home Office’s Operational Case for Bulk
Powers set out: ‘[i]t is entirely possible for a targeted “thematic” [equipment interfer-
ence] warrant to cover a large geographic area or involve the collection of a large
volume of data’ (Home Office 2016). The Investigatory Powers Bill considers this to
be ‘targeted’ rather than bulk, but the volume of data makes that argument a
largely semantic one. Some of these powers would have been considered ‘surveil-
lance’ in the past – interception, for example – but some would not, such as the acqui-
sition of BPDs directly from commercial operators.
(3) They work with commercial data gatherers. Through the PRISM programme, for
example, the NSA claimed to have ‘direct access’ to the servers of nine of the big com-
mercial operators: Microsoft, Yahoo, Google, Facebook, PalTalk, AOL, Skype, YouTube
and Apple. How this takes place and the extent of the cooperation and knowledge of
the commercial operators remains unclear. What is clear, however, is that the newer
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forms of surveillance access and use commercially gathered data and commercial sur-
veillance – and that they benefit from the profiling and analysis methods of commer-
cial operators. The ‘bulk powers’ in the Investigatory Powers Bill include acquisition of
communications data directly from commercial data gatherers, whilst the BPDs in the
same bill would often be acquired directly from these commercial data gatherers.
These issues are not of themselves new – commercial operators have cooperated with
government surveillance since the earliest days of telecommunications for example – it is
the combination of these factors that creates the ‘new’ kind of surveillance.
2.1. Surveillance in a new internet
What also makes this kind of surveillance new is the way that we use the internet. In par-
ticular the way that the internet is used for almost every aspect of our lives. It is not just a
means of communication, it is a way that we manage our social lives, apply for jobs, seek
information about our health, do our shopping, our banking, seek and find romance,
choose and consume entertainment and much more. The implications of this are consider-
able: even to the extent that although surveillance techniques are not all new, their
relationship to people’s lives and their potential impact is new.
The growth of social networking sites and the development of profiling and behav-
ioural tracking systems and their equivalents change the scope of the information avail-
able: it is not just information that we impart deliberately that is available, but
information derived from analysis of that information and from our behaviour can also
become available. In parallel with this, technological developments have changed the
nature of the data that can be obtained by surveillance – for example the increased use
of smartphones and related technologies provides new dimensions of data such as geo-
location data and biometric data including facial recognition and fingerprints, and allows
further levels of aggregation and analysis.
This combination of factors means that the ‘new’ surveillance is both qualitatively and
quantitatively different from ‘traditional’ surveillance or interception of communications.
Where traditional ‘communications’ was seen as a subset of traditional privacy rights, as
reflected in its part within Article 8 of the ECHR, the new form of communications has a
much broader relevance, a wider scope, and brings into play a much broader array of
human rights.12 The surveillance too is different – and the impact that it can have is differ-
ent: more extensive, more multifaceted and with a greater impact on the people subjected
to it.
The nature of the technology also means that surveillance that would have been over-
whelmingly expensive, as well as immensely challenging on a practical level, has now
become relatively simple and inexpensive, and hence, for governments, attractive. Pro-
grammes that work along these lines are widespread. In France, what was described by
Le Monde in 2013 as ‘le Big Brother français’ was passed in 201513 – an intelligence-gather-
ing law which includes provisions for mass retention of communications metadata –whilst
in Australia, the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment (Data Reten-
tion) Act of 2015 works upon essentially the same basis. The controversial FRA:Lagen in
Sweden includes similar provisions (Klamberg 2010) and in Belgium a ‘Royal Degree’ in
September 2013 appears to provide equally extensive powers. India’s ‘Central Monitoring
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System’ – perhaps even more intrusive – is reported to be rolling out in 2016. The extent to
which more seemingly repressive regimes utilise these kinds of technologies is largely a
subject of conjecture; it is a reasonable assumption that it is used extensively.
2.2. Metadata vs. content
Politicians and members of the intelligence community have been at pains to point out
that these programmes do not involve the content of communications. US President
Barack Obama made it the focus of his first address after the revelations of Edward
Snowden, on 7 June 2013. ‘Nobody is listening to your telephone calls’, was a point he
emphasised. William Hague, then UK Foreign Secretary, addressing Parliament about
the UK’s involvement with PRISM and related programmes, was similarly adamant and
similarly focused: ‘[o]ur laws do not provide for indiscriminate trawling for information
through the contents of people’s communications’.14 Former GCHQ Director Sir David
Omand told the BBC on 8 October 2013 that ‘nobody is reading all your emails’.
In human rights law, however, the significance of metadata has been noted since 1984.
In Malone,15 the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) ruled that release of records of
‘metering’ – the analogue telephony equivalent of metadata – to the police amounted to
interference with Article 8 of the ECHR. In practice, furthermore, metadata can be more
helpful for surveillance than content. Metadata by its nature is more easily analysed and
aggregated. The formats are standardised, much of it is numeric and can be subjected
to quantitative analysis – particularly significant in the ‘big data’. Moreover, content can
be written in indirect forms, working by innuendo or in language not easily or automati-
cally understandable. On the kinds of scales envisaged by mass surveillance, the idea of
actually ‘reading’ or ‘listening’ to content is not practical until the very latest stages of
analysis. Content is much more easily and regularly encrypted than metadata. Finally,
metadata can include new types of data such as geolocation data, data about devices
used and so forth. Metadata is not less intrusive than content: it might best be described
as ‘differently intrusive’.
2.3. What is ‘Surveillance’ and when does it occur?
In her evidence to the Joint Parliamentary Committee on the Draft Investigatory Powers
Bill in January 2016, the then Home Secretary Theresa May stated categorically that the
UK does not engage in mass surveillance (JPCIPB 2016). The Investigatory Powers Bill
uses the word ‘bulk’ rather than ‘mass’ – and quite how ‘bulky’ these ‘bulk’ powers
really are remains less than clear, despite the issuance of detailed codes of practice. A simi-
larly semantic argument was the key element in the CJEU’s striking down of the ‘Safe
Harbour’ agreement over data sharing between the European Union and the United
States in the Schrems case.16 Advocate General Bot said that ‘interference with fundamen-
tal rights is contrary to the principle of proportionality, in particular because the surveil-
lance carried out by the United States intelligence services is mass, indiscriminate
surveillance’ (CJEU 2015). The US response was immediate: its Mission to the European
Union stated that ‘[t]he United States does not and has not engaged in indiscriminate sur-
veillance of anyone, including ordinary European citizens’ (US Mission 2015).
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David Lyon, in Surveillance Studies: An Overview defined surveillance as ‘the focused, sys-
tematic and routine attention to personal details for purposes of influence, management,
protection or direction’ (Lyon 2007), a description which captures the essence of surveil-
lance but still leaves significant questions to be answered. What is ‘attention’ and when
can it be ‘focussed’ – and by whom or what? In the context of data surveillance there
are, very broadly speaking, three stages: the gathering or collecting of data, the automated
analysis of data (including algorithmic filtering), and then the ‘human’ examination of the
results of that analysis of filtering.
This is where the difference in views as to whether the UK and US engage in ‘mass sur-
veillance’ lies: the CJEU and privacy advocates could argue that the ‘surveillance’ happens
at the first stage – when data are gathered or collected – while the UK and US govern-
ments could argue that it happens at the third stage – when human beings are involved.
If the surveillance occurs when data are gathered, there is little doubt that many of the
modern forms of surveillance, including powers envisaged by the Investigatory Powers Bill,
would constitute mass surveillance. Data are gathered in massive quantities through the
various ‘bulk’ powers, as well as the ‘Internet Connection Records’ – effectively a truncated
form of browsing history, to be created and retained by communications providers on all
their subscribers.17 If, however, surveillance only occurs when human beings are involved
in the process, then Theresa May can argue her point, as can the US Mission to the Euro-
pean Union: the amount of information looked at by humans may well not be ‘massive’ or
‘indiscriminate’ regardless of how much data are gathered.
In Lyon’s terms, the answer may lie more accurately in the complex, multifaceted
second stage of the process, where automated algorithmic analysis is applied. What an
algorithm does could be described as ‘focused, systematic and routine attention’ to
data. In the future this is likely to be more significant; in commercial terms surveillance
by algorithm is already more important than surveillance by human eyes, ears and
minds, as the business models of Google, Facebook and others demonstrate. Algorithmic
analysis, however, depends on the prior gathering of data on a large scale – something,
therefore, in which governments and businesses have a shared interest.
In the end, however, the question of whether data gathering or algorithmic analysis
constitutes ‘surveillance’ is largely a semantic point. Many of the key risks occur when
data are gathered – the existence of data creates the risk. As a consequence it is at the
data-gathering phase that the first privacy invasion occurs, regardless of whether that
phase is described as surveillance or not. This has been reflected consistently in rulings
at both the CJEU18 and of the ECtHR.19
2.4. Overt and covert surveillance
Overt surveillance brings the Panopticon effect into play. The premise of Bentham’s
Panopticon was not that prisoners would be observed all the time, but that they would
be aware that they might be observed at any time, and would curb their behaviour accord-
ingly. That, in effect, is exactly what the kind of internet surveillance systems being dis-
cussed here would do. The idea that the authorities would be able to look at anything,
either through access to archives or access to real time feeds, precisely mirrors Bentham’s
envisaged observation capabilities of prison guards. From Bentham’s perspective, the
Panopticon was an appropriate way to deal with potentially violent offenders. The
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problem with the internet surveillance Panopticon is that it treats all people as potentially
violent offenders.
Covert surveillance has risks that are qualitatively different. In The Dangers of Surveil-
lance Richards outlines what is perhaps the most significant aspect: the way that surveil-
lance, and covert surveillance in particular, gives the watchers power over those who they
watch.
‘It might sound trite to say that “information is power,” but the power of personal infor-
mation lies at the heart of surveillance. The power effects of surveillance illustrate three
additional dangers of surveillance: blackmail, discrimination, and persuasion’ (Richards
2013).
These three dangers are representative of one of the key aspects of surveillance: it pro-
vides tools to enable influence and control. They help explain why authoritarian regimes
have used data gathering as one of the key tools to create conformity and reduce the risk
of dissent.20 It is an effect recognised both in the past and present, and with implications
for the future. Emily Taylor notes that, ‘The human rights impact of data retention on the
ability to create profiles, or to confirm a future suspicion, has rightly been highlighted as a
human rights risk by commentators as diverse as Cardinal Richelieu and Evgeny Morozov’
(Taylor 2016, referring to Morozov 2014).21
This ‘power effect’ applies to overt as well as covert surveillance, though not in exactly
the same way; having information gives power, but having information that the subject
does not know that you have gives a different kind of power. This applies particularly to
the discrimination and persuasion aspect: the subject might not know either that they
are being discriminated against or persuaded or that it is possible for that to happen.
2.5. Surveillance as a harm in itself
One of the conclusions of Richards’ analysis is to recognise that surveillance is harmful in
itself. This is a fundamental issue, hitting at the ideas of liberty that have been discussed
for many centuries. This is historian Quentin Skinner:
I think it very important that the mere fact of there being surveillance takes away liberty. The
response of those who are worried about surveillance has so far been too much couched, it
seems to me, in terms of the violation of the right to privacy. Of course it’s true that my
privacy has been violated if someone is reading my emails without my knowledge. But my
point is that my liberty is also being violated, and not merely by the fact that someone is
reading my emails but also by the fact that someone has the power to do so should they
choose.22
Skinner’s argument is about the existence of the system – and hence about the data gath-
ering rather than the human examination. That is the logic behind the recognition by the
ECtHR that data gathering in itself engages Article 8 of the ECHR directly. This can be
traced back to Klass v. Germany in 1978, where it was ruled that:
… in the mere existence of the legislation itself there is involved, for all those to whom the
legislation could be applied, a menace of surveillance; this menace necessarily strikes at
freedom of communication between users of the postal and telecommunication services
and thereby constitutes an ‘interference by a public authority’ with the exercise of the appli-
cants’ right to respect for private and family life and for correspondence.23
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The conclusion drawn by the court in S and Marper v. the United Kingdom in 2009, that ‘the
mere retention and storing of personal data by public authorities, however obtained, are
to be regarded as having direct impact on the private-life interest of an individual con-
cerned, irrespective of whether subsequent use is made of the data’24 is a logical extension
of this analysis. It is the development of systems and laws to allow the gathering of that
data that produces the menace of surveillance, not that allows the examination or use
of the data gathered. It is the gathering stage, therefore which should start the rights-bal-
ancing exercise. This understanding underlies subsequent rulings of both the ECtHR25 and
the CJEU.26 In Szabo v Hungary in 2016, the ECtHR noted that this point was becoming
increasingly signiﬁcant:
Given the technological advances since the Klass and Others case, the potential interferences
with email, mobile phone and Internet services as well as those of mass surveillance attract the
Convention protection of private life even more acutely.27
Not only are the risks and harms already in play by the gathering stage, but the key possi-
bilities of data vulnerability and function creep come to the fore. Once the data have been
gathered or the surveillance system put in place, both data and systems are vulnerable to
‘intentional’ or accidental misuse or loss by authorities or vulnerability to misuse by others.
Data gathered by surveillance is vulnerable in all the same ways that other data are vul-
nerable: vulnerable to misuse, to misappropriation, to hacking, to loss, to corruption and
error, and to what is loosely described as ‘function creep’. Security services and other auth-
orities are not immune to that vulnerability – as the leaks through WikiLeaks, the revel-
ations of Edward Snowden, the numerous data losses by the Ministry of Defence and
others have demonstrated (Bernal 2014, Chap. 7). The surveillance systems themselves
are vulnerable: build a back door into a system and it is not only those who are intended
to use it who can use it as a way to access that system. Install a ‘black box’ into an internet
service provider’s premises and that black box can itself be hacked and accessed.
2.6. Surveillance damaging security?
This also means that though the general argument made is that building surveillance
systems and gathering data is to improve security – a term that is itself very hard to
define – it can also both in practice damage security and increase risks. There are
further arguments in that direction. Former NSA Technical Director William Binney
noted in his evidence to the Joint Parliamentary Committee on the Investigatory
Powers Bill that:
… over the last fifteen years, the bulk collection approach has cost lives, including lives in
Britain, because it inundates analysts with too much data. It is 99 per cent useless, as
attacks occur when intelligence and law enforcement lose focus on previously suspected ter-
rorists and fail to find accomplices or others enabling fresh attacks. (JPCIPB 2016)
This is Bruce Schneier in Data and Goliath in 2015:
Terrorist plots are different [from the kind of commercial fraud that data mining has worked
well in detecting], mostly because whereas fraud is common, terrorist attacks are very rare.
This means that even highly accurate terrorism prediction systems will be so flooded with
false alarms that they will be useless.
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… In the years after 9/11, the NSA passed to the FBI thousands of tips per month; every one of
them turned out to be a false alarm. The cost was enormous, and ended up frustrating the FBI
agents who were obliged to investigate all the tips. (Schneier 2015)
Former Shadow Home Secretary, David Davis MP, made a similar point in the House of
Commons debate on the Investigatory Powers Bill in March 2016: ‘[t]here are genuine con-
cerns that the collect-it-all approach actually makes things worse’.28
These views are contested – not least by GCHQ – but they do open the question as to
whether the bulk data collection approach is straightforwardly positive for security from
terrorism and similar dangers. That in turn adds doubt to the ‘privacy vs. security’ dichot-
omy, and the possibility that data gathering and surveillance could do harm to both
privacy and security. There are further, more abstract arguments in the same area, with
some backing from history: where excessive ‘security’ measures are brought in they can
lower the level of trust and, as a consequence, lower levels of cooperation with authorities,
which again could damage rather than help security. The idea that ‘tightening’ security
actually improves security is one that should not be taken at face value.
3. The impact on human rights
Surveillance in its new form has human rights implications beyond the obvious-seeming
intrusions into privacy of correspondence – one aspect of Article 8 (1) of the ECHR – into
people’s private lives themselves, and further, upon Articles 6, 9, 10, 11 and 14 of the ECHR.
Privacy is not the only issue – partly because privacy underpins other rights (and in par-
ticular rights that are very much not individual, such as freedom of association and assem-
bly) and partly because of the nature of the internet and how we now use it. To focus only
on privacy can make the risks of surveillance seem less significant than they are and hence
set the criteria upon which it is decided whether surveillance is appropriate or legitimate,
too low.
3.1. Article 8: right to respect for private and family life
Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his
correspondence.29
Great play has been made by politicians that the new surveillance does not include the
‘content’ of calls, just the metadata. As computer scientists and others have pointed
out, this largely misses the point. As Professor Edward Felten put it in the context of
telephony:
… analysis of telephony metadata often reveals information that could traditionally only be
obtained by examining the content of communications. That is, metadata is often a proxy
for content.30
Felten was writing about telephony metadata, but the data gathered by internet surveil-
lance covers far more than that, and can be even more revealing. Internet surveillance can,
without even considering content, provide more information about someone’s communi-
cations, and in a far more accessible form, than conventional wiretapping even where that
conventional wiretapping would have included contents.
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Article 8 provides for protection for private and family life as well as for correspondence.
On the surface, it might appear that ‘communications data’ relates to the ‘correspondence’
part of Article 8 – communications like telephone calls, emails, text messages and tweets
fit into this category – but internet communications data have a broader impact upon the
‘private life’ aspect of the Article. Web-browsing data can be used to uncover far more inti-
mate, important and personal information than is immediately obvious. It shows which
websites are visited, which search terms are used, which links are followed, which files
are downloaded – and also when, and how long sites are perused, using what kind of com-
puter, phone or other device and so forth. When the other data that is being gathered
through commercial and governmental internet surveillance – from traditional communi-
cations data like email, text messages and phone calls to music listened to on Smart-
phones, geolocation data, etc. – is added to this, aggregated and analysed, the
potential becomes even greater.
This data can reveal habits, preferences and tastes – and can uncover, to a reasonable
probability, religion, sexual preferences, political leanings and more. It can dig deep into
personal lives. People use the internet to establish and support personal relationships,
to find jobs, to bank, to shop, to gather the news, to decide where to go on holiday, to
concerts, museums or football matches. Some use it for education and for religious obser-
vance – checking the times and dates of festivals or details of dietary rules. There are very
few areas of peoples lives that remain untouched by the internet.
Furthermore, analytical methods through which more personal and private data can be
derived from browsing habits have already been developed, and are continuing to be
refined and extended, for example by the behavioural advertising industry. Significant
amounts of money and effort are being spent in this direction – it is a key part of the
business models of Google, Facebook and others. The profiling and predictive capabilities
will develop further both in scope and in accuracy in the future.
This is not profiling in the conventional ‘psychological’ form, based on educated
guesses and theoretical associations: it is mathematical profiling, based on correlations
determined by comparisons of massive amounts of data. The techniques and technologies
developed to profile for advertising can be applied just as easily to other forms of profiling,
whether they be political, religious, ethnic or any other kind. Data gathering can therefore
impact upon any aspect of a private life.31
3.2. Article 9: freedom of thought, conscience and religion
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion … 32
This kind of proﬁling can also bring Article 9 into play. It can be possible to determine (to a
reasonable probability) individuals’ religions, politics and philosophy, the languages they
use and even their ethnic origins,33 and then use that information to monitor them both
online and ofﬂine. It could potentially be used to limit or control the activities of people
that ﬁt within a particular religious outlook – and it can also be used to limit the related
rights to freedom of association and assembly.
Although it could be seen as a stretch to suggest that such profiling might allow a pro-
filer to know what someone is thinking, that, effectively, is its aim. Apple Google and
Microsoft’s ‘digital assistants’, Siri, Now and Cortana respectively, all aim to predict what
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you want to know.34 Indeed, it has been argued that Google and Facebook can know
people better than they know themselves, as they are free from ‘self-deception’.35 From
the perspective of the profiler (and the commercial profiler in particular) precise accuracy
may not be crucial; a reasonable probability may be all that is needed. From the perspec-
tive of those being profiled, the situation is very different – and problems may arise from
both accurate and inaccurate profiling. A real ‘dissident’, for example, may be located and
imprisoned by an accurate profile, while an ‘innocent’ may be unfairly punished by an
inaccurate profile.36 Further, as discussed in more depth in Section 3.6 below, there is a
growing potential for discrimination on the basis of these profiles.
3.3. Article 10: freedom of expression
Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public auth-
orities and regardless of frontiers … 37
Though the connection between freedom of expression and privacy may not be obvious –
indeed, the two may appear at times to be in conﬂict – for freedom of expression to func-
tion properly there must be a degree of privacy. There are direct impacts on journalism –
as US journalism professors noted in their ‘Comment to the Review Group on Intelligence
and Communications Technologies’,38 including reducing the trust required for conﬁden-
tial discussions with sources, chilling effects not just in terms of the output of journalism
but the correspondence and communications – the research – that is fundamental to that
journalism.
There are particular issues in relation to sources. As Lord Woolf CJ put it, ‘The fact that
journalists’ sources can be reasonably confident that their identity will not be disclosed
makes a significant contribution to the ability of the press to perform their role in
society of making information available to the public.’39
After revelations involving the Metropolitan Police and Kent Police Service in 2014, the
Interception of Communications Commissioner’s Office (IOCCO) undertook an inquiry into
the use of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act to identify journalistic sources. This
inquiry revealed that in a three-year period ‘19 police forces reported undertaking 34
investigations which sought communications data in relation to suspected illicit relation-
ships between public officials (sources) and journalists. The 34 investigations concerned
relationships between 105 journalists and 242 sources’ (IOCCO 2015). IOCCO noted that:
… even though the requirement to identify the source may appear, taking account of the
requirements of Article 10, legitimate in order to investigate a serious crime or address
matters relating to national security, the chilling effect or collateral impact is ever present.
IOCCO is not suggesting that this means that use of surveillance to identify journalistic
sources is necessarily inappropriate, rather that the chilling effect needs to be part of
the balancing exercise.
Privacy is not just important for journalists, but crucial for free expression in a wide
range of other situations, from those dissenting against oppression, to those threatened
by abusive spouses, to whistle-blowers and so forth. Without a reasonable expectation
of privacy, many of these would simply choose not to speak out. Further, surveillance
chills not only those imparting but those receiving information – both sides of the
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Article 11 rights. If someone knows that their web browsing is monitored, the Panopticon
effect will make them less likely to visit sites they believe the authorities might deem sub-
versive or inappropriate.
UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of
opinion and expression, Frank La Rue, set out the issue in his report to the Human
Rights Council in April 2013:
States cannot ensure that individuals are able to freely seek and receive information or express
themselves without respecting, protecting and promoting their right to privacy. Privacy and
freedom of expression are interlinked and mutually dependent; and infringement upon one
can be both the cause and consequence of an infringement upon the other. (La Rue 2013)
La Rue was writing before the Snowden’s revelations; the scale of the surveillance sub-
sequently revealed makes his comments even more apt. There is growing empirical evi-
dence to support the existence of this kind of a chill in practice. In 2013, a report by
PEN America, based on a detailed survey of writers in the light of the Snowden revelations,
found amongst other things that 28% had ‘curtailed or avoided social media activities’ and
another 12% had ‘seriously’ considered doing so, 24% had deliberately avoided certain
topics in phone or email conversations. That survey data are reinforced by more recent
academic analysis. In 2016 Jonathon Penney analysed trafﬁc to privacy-sensitive Wikipedia
articles and found statistically signiﬁcant declines not only in the immediate aftermath of
the Snowden revelations but in the long term. The chilling effect in terms of access to
information is not just theoretical but empirically evidenced (Penney 2016). Further, Eliza-
beth Stoycheff’s 2016 study of Facebook activity revealed that, ‘ … knowing one’s online
activities are subject to government interception and believing these surveillance prac-
tices are necessary for national security play important roles in inﬂuencing conformist
behavior’ (Stoycheff 2016).
That influence, Stoycheff concludes, is in effect a chilling of speech, particularly of min-
ority opinion. Again it is important to note that this does not necessarily mean that surveil-
lance is inappropriate – indeed, for security purposes a chill may be both intentional and
desirable, such as the chilling of extremist speech – but nonetheless it should be con-
sidered when looking at the balancing exercise. Moreover, this tendency to conformity
is not something new: Timothy Garton Ash noted it was part of the effect (and possibly
the purpose) of Stasi data gathering and surveillance:
More typical were the nice couple from whom the University had rented my room. Intelligent,
well-educated, well-informed through watching Western television, they nonetheless devoted
virtually all their energies to their private lives, and particularly to extending, decorating and
maintaining their cottage on a small lake some half-an-hour’s drive from Berlin. (Garton Ash
2009)
3.4. Article 6: the right to a fair trial
In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him,
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent
and impartial tribunal established by law.40
Surveillance can interfere with legal processes in a number of ways. In a similar fashion to
its interference with journalists’ communications with their sources, surveillance can
JOURNAL OF CYBER POLICY 13
interfere with lawyers’ correspondence with their clients. As the Bar Council pointed out in
their press release in relation to the Investigatory Powers Bill in March 2016:
The fact that a person suspects that communications with his or her legal adviser may find
their way to the opposing party, or may be subject to surveillance by intelligence agencies,
means that they may then be inclined to tell only part of the truth. This has a ‘chilling
effect’ on free and frank lawyer-client communication. (Bar Council 2016)
There is a potential for further impact: the power effect of covert surveillance applies
directly in relation to both the police and prosecuting authorities. Access to information,
and the ability to utilise that information, can directly and potentially prejudicially inﬂu-
ence justice.
3.5. Article 11: freedom of assembly and association
Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with
others … 41
The internet offers previously unimaginable tools for groups – and for assembly and
association of all kinds. Online communities have developed, using services like social net-
working, instant messaging and message boards, and ‘real world’ groups have used the
same tools to facilitate their ‘real world’ meetings and communications. In this way, the
internet can often be seen as a force for ‘good’, for ‘democracy’. Many commentators
suggested that the internet played a key role in the Arab Spring – and though its role
may well have been exaggerated, the internet was certainly used by many of those organ-
ising the resistance in Tunisia and Egypt in particular.
However, when communications, and in particular the internet, are used to organise
meetings, to communicate as groups, and to assemble both offline and online, internet
surveillance can become significant and dangerous. Meetings can be monitored or even
prevented from occurring, groups can be targeted and members identified. Oppressive
regimes throughout the world have recognised and indeed used this ability – in
Tunisia, for example the former regime hacked into both Facebook and Twitter to
attempt to monitor the activities of potential rebels.42 The knowledge of the existence
of surveillance, as Stoycheff noted, also tends to produce more conformist behaviour,
which would impact directly on willingness to exercise freedom of both assembly and
association and hence those freedoms themselves.
It is not just in extreme situations such as a political uprising that internet surveillance is
relevant to association and assembly. Authorities in the UK, for example, have argued that
it would be right to monitor social media during a riot – and with some justification – but
what about a peaceful protest? Then what about those organising a protest, before the
event? How about a trade union? It is easy to make a decision on an extreme case –
but there are grey areas and the temptation for authorities to use tools once they are in
place can be hard to resist.43 In June 2013, for example, the UK government monitored
social media activities concerning the controversial cull of badgers. With headlines such
as that from the BBC that read, ‘Whitehall chiefs scan Twitter to head off badger protests’44
it is easy to see how this kind of surveillance can interfere with Article 11 rights.45 When
technologies like geolocation data are taken into account, allowing authorities to locate
physically those wishing to assemble, that potential becomes even more significant and
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relevant. In 2013 Electronic Frontier Foundation filed with a federal judge 22 separate
examples from advocacy groups of how mass surveillance of telecoms data has
‘impeded the groups’ work, discouraged their members and reduced the numbers of
people seeking their help via hotlines’ (EFF 2013).
Another graphic example took place in Ukraine in January 2014. Whilst a protest was
taking place in Kiev,46 people whose mobile phones indicated that they were in the vicin-
ity of the protest, were sent text messages saying that they ‘ha[d] been registered as par-
ticipating in mass disturbance’. Surveillance was used to locate the people, the phones
themselves used to communicate that fact – as well as to attempt to intimidate people
into not participating in further protests. There are many implications of this; interference
with the rights of freedom of assembly and association is only part of the problem. The
assumptions that being in the vicinity makes a person part of the protest, and that the
owner of a phone is the person in possession of that phone at that moment are both pro-
blematic – that they have been ‘registered’ onto a database opens up further opportu-
nities for abuse. This ‘SMS bombing’ might also have been intended to deter any
further such protests – the ‘conformity’ effect noted by Stoycheff and Garton Ash. Both
the Panopticon effect and the power effect apply in situations like this. Surveillance of
this kind both chills expression and assembly, and increases the level of power that can
be exerted by authorities over those involved, directly or indirectly. The increasing inter-
actions between technologies – here the geolocation plus the communication capabilities
of mobile phones – creates more possibilities. The internet of things and other new tech-
nologies will make this even more significant.
The interaction between governments and commercial and other organisations adds
another dimension to this. Data gathered by governments may be passed on to, or be
hacked or otherwise obtained by, other interested parties. If arms manufacturers get
hold of data about anti-arms trade meetings, protests and protesters, they could stop
the meetings or protests. In relation to the badger cull protests, for example, UK police
suggested that they can and will pass personal information on protestors to the National
Farmer’s Union who represent the farmers supporting the cull.47
Surveillance need not invade privacy to infringe on Articles 10 and 11. Monitoring
Twitter, as for the badger cull, does not directly invade privacy, as in general, tweets are
public rather than private, but performing surveillance of those public tweets in order
to ‘head off’ protests could potentially interfere with the expression, association and
assembly rights involved in public protest. This hints at a more significant point: the
power effect of gathering and holding data does not, primarily, impact upon privacy
but autonomy. Whether data gathered are private is not the significant part; it is how
the data may be used that matters.
3.6. Article 14: prohibition of discrimination
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured
without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political
or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property,
birth or other status.48
Not only can surveillance and proﬁling enable discrimination – it can potentially automate
it. It may be possible to determine almost any kind of detail about a person online through
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proﬁling: their age, religion, nationality, ethnic origin and more. Decisions and options
available to a person may then be automatically controlled on the basis of that proﬁling
– and the person involved may never even know what is happening. A website could
assess the proﬁle of the person visiting and change the options displayed dependent
on any aspect of that proﬁle – and this kind of ‘personalisation’ is being most actively
developed by some key players on the internet.49 In March 2016, for example, it was
revealed that Facebook was showing different trailers for the same ﬁlm based on the
race to which it assessed the user belonged; not self-declared race, but assessed algorith-
mically using a system Facebook calls ‘afﬁnity groups’.50
In a similar way, automated processes and filters could pick out people whose profile
suggests authority might want to examine them more closely – by religion, political
views, union membership and so forth – engaging Article 8 in a discriminatory way. Simi-
larly, people could be prevented from accessing information or even commenting on par-
ticular internet forums based on their profiles, impacting upon their Article 10 rights in a
discriminatory way. The same is possible for Article 11 rights to assemble and associate –
and all without direct human involvement.
Two 2014 reports following parallel reviews of ‘big data practices’ for the White House
raised discrimination as an issue. John Podesta, whose task force put together one of the
reports, Seizing Opportunities, Preserving Values (Podesta 2014), told Associated Press that
he had ‘newfound concern’ over how big data ‘could be used to target consumers and
lead to discriminatory practices’. Concern over the potentially discriminatory effects of
‘big data’ practices is a key finding of the report, and addressing them one of its six
recommendations.
Seizing Opportunities, Preserving Values and its parallel report, ‘Big Data and Privacy: A
Technological Perspective’ (PCAST 2014), detail a number of such possibilities, including
the suggestion that differential pricing is likely to become more prevalent and less trans-
parent. That such opportunities arise from commercial practices means similar practices
become equally possible for government agencies. As Seizing Opportunities, Preserving
Values notes:
Powerful private-sector profiling and data-mining technologies are not only used for commer-
cial purposes. State, local and federal agencies purchase access to many kinds of private data-
bases for legitimate public uses, from land management to administering benefits … some
legal scholars and privacy advocates have already raised concerns about the use of commer-
cial data service products by the government, including law enforcement and intelligence
services.
It would be naïve to suggest that government agencies would only use data mining, pro-
ﬁling and related processes for transparent and clearly legitimate purposes – and not in
more opaque circumstances and for less obviously legitimate purposes. One of the
most notable features of the programmes revealed has been their lack of transparency;
even people who are experts in the ﬁeld seemed to have been genuinely surprised by
their existence.
3.7. Necessary in a democratic society?
The key ECHR Articles referred to above are subject to qualifications. This is Article 8 (2):
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There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such
as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention
of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights
and freedoms of others.51
There are similar caveats in articles 6, 9, 10 and 11. The reference to data gathering and
surveillance being ‘necessary in a democratic society’ is the crux of the issue. In what
way and to what extent, can they be considered ‘necessary’ in a democratic society?
Data gathering and surveillance can interfere significantly with a wide spectrum of indi-
vidual human rights. Given this, the bar should be very high in terms of the ‘need’ for that
surveillance – and proper evidence should be presented and scrutinised before that ‘need’
is accepted. The evidence provided by the US and UK authorities in public, has been very
limited to date. In the US it has tended to collapse under close scrutiny52 whilst in the UK
the combination of the government policy of ‘neither confirm nor deny’ and the private
hearings of both the Investigatory Powers Tribunal and the Parliamentary ISC means
that verification of claims of the effectiveness and need for surveillance, and mass data
gathering in particular, is very difficult
It is becoming insufficient for the authorities to say, ‘Trust us’ when this level of inter-
ference with human rights is possible. Indeed, the prime motivation for the establishment
of the various human rights treaties and conventions was precisely because authorities
had demonstrated that they could not be trusted, and that they needed to be able to
be held accountable. As David Anderson QC, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism
Legislation, put it, ‘the road to a better system must be paved with trust’ (Anderson 2015).
A key difference between a ‘democratic society’ and an authoritarian society – or even
what might be labelled a ‘police state’ – is related to assumptions and defaults. In a police
state the assumption is one of suspicion and distrust. People are assumed to be untrust-
worthy and generalised and universal surveillance makes sense; the legal, technical and
bureaucratic systems are built with that universal surveillance in mind. The police states
with which most people are familiar demonstrate this graphically: former communist
countries, such as East Germany and Romania, relied on the most extensive secret
police systems possible at the time: the Stasi and Securitate. They gathered data on a
massive scale, using whatever methods were available at the time.53 As Vaizey put it, ‘
… the Stasi had observed and photographed people’s movements, secretly searched
their homes, listened in to their telephone conversations, and even collected smell
samples in jars, the idea being that trained sniffer dogs could tell where a person had
been’ (Vaizey 2014).
The parallels between this and the current data-gathering practices on the internet
should be clear. The more despotic regimes currently holding power around the world
follow that kind of logic; monitoring social networks and controlling the internet is a
key part of that.54 Everyone is a suspect: everyone might be a terrorist, a subversive, a pae-
dophile, a criminal.
In a democratic society, the reverse should be true – people generally assumed to be
trustworthy and worthy of respect, with the ‘criminals’, ‘subversives’ and ‘terrorists’ very
much the exception. The powerful idea of ‘innocent until proven guilty’ is a reflection of
this. The key to a democratic society is not that the people should ‘trust’ the authorities
– but that the institutions are set up with sufficient limitations in their power: with
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oversight, accountability and transparency. It is not the authorities themselves that need
to be trusted, but those systems, checks and balances. Further, in a democratic state, poli-
cing is intended to be by consent, as set out in the ‘Peelian Principles’ established by Sir
Robert Peel, the founder of the original Metropolitan Police. The police ‘represent’ the
people, enforcing rules and laws that the people generally believe in and support.55
If it is understood that the gathering of data has an impact on a broad range of the
rights of citizens, then the consequence is direct: gathering data on citizens as a matter
of course, regardless of guilt or innocence, fits much more closely with the methods of
the Stasi than it does with a classically democratic society. Gathering data on a massive
scale – whether it is to be considered to amount to surveillance or not – cannot therefore
be said to be ‘necessary in a democratic society’ without cause.
4. Recasting the debate
Arguments over surveillance will remain critical for the foreseeable future. There is no pro-
spect either of mass internet surveillance being accepted by all, or of being abandoned by
the authorities in any modern state. That makes the debate over how that surveillance
should happen, what limits should be placed upon it, how it should be overseen and
the legislation under which it operates, a crucial one – and means that the terms under
which the debate takes place need to be appropriate.
. First of all, the debate over what is or is not surveillance needs to be put to one side. It is
largely a semantic argument once it is understood that the gathering of data itself has
an impact. The argument that controls only need applying at the stage where ‘human
eyes’ are involved is no longer tenable.
. Secondly, that this impact is not just on privacy but on a broad range of rights – and
indeed on autonomy and freedom in almost every aspect of our lives.
. Thirdly, these are not just ‘individual’ rights, but rights that relate to our functioning as a
community, such as freedom of association and assembly, as well as freedom of
expression.
. Fourthly, the idea that data-gathering and surveillance activities are necessarily positive
for security is challengeable.
. Fifthly, metadata or communications data is not less intrusive than ‘content’, but differ-
ently intrusive. The legal approach to surveillance and data gathering should not
assume that collection or examination of metadata requires a lower level of scrutiny
or accountability.
. Sixthly, data gathering and surveillance involves both commercial and governmental
organisations, and to consider them separately is to misunderstand the nature of
both. The government uses data gathered by commerce, methods developed by com-
merce and piggyback on systems used by commerce.
The result of all this is that the balancing exercise required to determine whether data
gathering and surveillance is justified needs to be recalibrated: the benefits of that surveil-
lance need to be much greater than if they were only impacting upon individual privacy.
Perhaps most importantly this means that the gathering and holding – or requiring of
others to hold – communications data needs to be taken more seriously. To put the
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primary controls in place only at the accessing stage – and to consider the balancing exer-
cise only at that stage – is to misunderstand the risks associated with the gathering and
holding of this data. As the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy put it, when
assessing the Investigatory Powers Bill: ‘It would appear that the serious and possibly unin-
tended consequences of legitimising bulk interception and bulk hacking are not being
fully appreciated by the UK Government’ (Cannataci 2016).
Statements such as Theresa May’s that ‘the UK does not engage in mass surveillance’
though semantically arguable, are in effect deeply unhelpful. A more accurate statement
would be that
the UK engages in bulk data gathering that interferes not only with privacy but with freedom
of expression, association and assembly, the right to a free trial and the prohibition of discrimi-
nation, and which puts people at a wide variety of unacknowledged and unquantified risks.
Whether the benefits from this bulk data gathering are sufficient to outweigh this inter-
ference with rights and generation of risks can only be assessed if the interference with
rights and level of risk is appropriately acknowledged.
Finding a more appropriate balance does not just matter at the level of lawmaking.
Decisions about surveillance and data-gathering activities are made at many levels, includ-
ing the practical and operational level, based on the understanding that the authorising
person has of the impact of those activities. Whilst that understanding underestimates
the impact of the data gathering or surveillance, those decisions may be misjudged,
again at every level, from the most strategic policy level to the most practical and
operational.
All the factors discussed in this article are increasing in importance and in impact. As
technology develops, as algorithms improve, as the volume and nature of the data
increases so do all these pressures, and the current miscasting becomes more significant.
Add into the picture developments such as the Internet of Things and this accelerates
even faster. Laws and policies based on the current understanding and debate will
become even less relevant, even less manageable and even less effective than they are
now. That, in the end, is not sustainable.
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